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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
WILLIAM PATTON : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
: Case No. 970489-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Defendant was afforded sufficient discovery? 
2. Whether testimony of alleged ^surprise witness' had a 
prejudicial impact on Appellant? 
Both issues presented in this case represent mixed questions 
of law and fact. As such, there are two applicable standards of 
review. The first is applied to factual findings and the other 
to conclusions of law. As to factual determinations, the 
standard of review is one of clear error. State v. Case, 884 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
1 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). Conclusions of law, on the other hand 
are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Ramirez,
 N817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3). 
No trash, used materials, junk, household 
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or 
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The 
accumulation of more than one (1) such item constitutes 
a junk yard as defined in chapter 14.06, Provo City 
Code and must be removed from the property, stored 
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in 
an M-2 zone. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant William Patton and co-defendant, Joan Patton were 
served with summons on May 31, 1996, charging that on March 19, 
1996, both defendants were in violation of Provo City Code 
§14.34.080, a Class B misdemeanor. On May 19, 1997, a bench 
trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott resulted in the 
conviction of both defendants. Defendants were sentenced on June 
23, 1997. Joan Patton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth 
District Court the same day. On July 23, 1997, William Patton 
also filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court, 
commencing this action. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In November of 1995, Anthony Malloy came to work for Provo 
City as a zoning enforcement officer (Tr. at 7). Officer Malloy 
is assigned to a specific geographic area of Provo City (Tr. at 
2 
8). When officer Malloy was assigned to his area, he was given 
all the open files within that area (Tr. 8). Aside from clearing 
up the violations in the continuing files, officer Malloy is 
charged with addressing citizen complaints regarding zoning 
violations in his area (Tr. at 8) . 
One of the open files given to officer Malloy concerned 
Defendants' property (Tr. at 8). Defendants' have a history of 
zoning violations based on convictions for zoning violations in 
both 1990 and 1993 by two different judges (Sentencing Transcript 
at 8-9). In 1995, Provo City filed an order to show cause based 
on a continuing problem (Sentencing Transcript at 9-10). 
However, the notice was not filed in a timely manner and the 
Court's jurisdiction to extend Defendants' probation expired at 
the end of that year (Id). At this point, Officer Malloy was 
given the file and instructed to verify whether a continuing 
violation existed (Tr. at 8) . 
On or about February 23, 1996, officer Malloy visited 
defendants' property and confirmed the continuing existence of 
junk, trash, and other materials in the yard, in violation of 
Provo City Code §14-34-080 (Tr. at 8-9). Because defendants have 
a sign on their fence warning all local and federal agents to 
stay off the property, no personal contact was made with 
defendants (Tr. at 10). Instead, a letter was sent to defendants 
on February 23, 1996, requesting that they contact the zoning 
3 
office in order that compliance might be obtained (Tr. at 9-10). 
On March 11, 1996, in response to the above letter, officer 
Malloy received a correspondence from defendant Joan Patton (Tr. 
at 13). While different issues were addressed in the letter, 
there was never an expression of willingness to comply with the 
zoning ordinance. A second notice to comply was sent to 
Defendants the same day (Tr. at 12). This time Defendants failed 
to respond altogether (Id). On March 19, 1996, officer Malloy 
returned to Defendants' residence to confirm the continued 
existence of the violation (Id). During this visit, officer 
Malloy was accompanied by another zoning officer, Roger Gonzalez. 
Officer Gonzalez took several photographs of Defendants' yard for 
the purpose of documenting the zoning violation (Id). 
At trial, Defendants objected to the testimony of officer 
Gonzalez. According to testimony by Joan Patton, "I did not 
receive any discovery that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a 
witness, therefore I have not had a chance to prepare" (Tr. at 
63). All discovery in this case was conducted informally (Tr. at 
65). At trial, Gary McGinn, attorney for Provo City, stated: 
Joan Patton has come into my office several 
times. Our office has an open file policy. I 
believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has come in 
and asked for discovery. In our office if — and 
to show them, in our file — if they come in we'll 
allow them to look at the file, or we just make 
copies of everything that's in the file. We give 
everybody everything, there should be no secrets, 
that's our office policy and that's what we do. 
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in 
4 
several times, we do have a cover sheet. It has a 
list of our officers that says, "Anthony Kalloy, 
Roger Gonzalez from the zoning department." Any 
time they come in and take a look that's thfere... 
(Tr. at 64) . 
The Court denied the objection and allowed the testimony of 
officer Gonzalez (Tr. at 66). At the end of the trial, 
Defendants were convicted for violation of Provo City Code § 
14.34.080(3). The Court described the basis of its decision in 
the following language: 
In reading the statute and hearing the 
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and 
Mr. Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and 
the testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather 
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants' 
property complied in making it appear to be the 
same as the neighborhood in question, I find that 
the City has met its burden of proof concerning 
the second portion of that charging information in 
Count I, therefore I find the defendants guilty as 
charged. 
From the plain and simple meaning of the 
ordinance, so you have your record on appeal, 
folks, I believe that the evidence has 
sufficiently demonstrated that there are items 
which consist of junk, stored trash, scraps of 
wood, deteriorated cardboard boxes, and even 
potential food products that looked like they had 
gone bad, from the witnesses testimony. 
And with that testimony being the only 
testimony on the record, with nothing else to 
rebut it or to describe what it was, then the 
Court has only one conclusion to draw, and that is 
is it believable or is it not, and I find that the 
City has met its proof with respect to belief. 
(Tr. at 115-116). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
T:.e ^ - a - . - - ' • ;--"~ ' r * 
illegal storage of JUHK I:. violation of Provo Ciry Code 
§ ] 4 34.080(3) Defendants were afforded proper discovery in 
accordance with Plaintiff's standard open-file policy. Assuming 
arguendo that Plaintiff did fail to provide sufficient discovery, 
testimony from the alleged {surprise • = • s s • 1 ia• :i i : : pi: ejudicia 1 
impact on Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DIE NOT ERR, IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF ILLECV T. 
STORAGE OF JUNK 
Defendant was afforded proper discovery in accordance -
Plaintiff's open file pol icy 
Requests for discovery are governed by by Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. According . .. - -
must, upon request, disclose to the defendant "material or 
informati : -i i : f i i 1 :i :i cl :i 1 le I las ] :i 101 i] edge" e s t : ai i] , :i tern : f 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be 
made ava :i ] abJ e t : tl le defendant in order for the defendant LO 
adequately prepare his defense" {Id.). 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court of Utal I held that the prosecution must respond to 
discovery requests in a manner which is not misleading. order 
tc • a c I: l i e v e tl l i s ei I :i, tl i€ • C : i :i r t a :i : t : i c u l a t e d t ; : :i : eqi i :i i: eint . . , a t 
the prosecution must meet in responding to requests for 
discovery: 
First, the prosecution either must produce ,all of 
the material requested or must identify explicitly 
those portions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the 
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material 
requested, it must continue to disclose such material 
on an ongoing basis to the defense. 
Id. 
In this case, the gravamen of Defendants' appeal is based on 
a claim that Provo City failed to provide sufficient discovery. 
Specifically, it is claimed that Plaintiff failed to provide 
Defendants with a witness list. The trial court rejected this 
claim due to the fact that the record contained no request for 
the identification of witnesses (Tr. at 65-66). Defendants 
concede that "the entire discovery process has been handled very 
informally'' (Sentencing Transcript at 3) . 
This informality is an enormous benefit to defendants who 
are not currently required to petition the court or make formal 
written discovery requests to the City. Clearly, a more formal 
discovery process would inoculate the City from charges like 
those now brought by Defendants. Nevertheless, defendants, often 
appearing pro se, would hardly be served by the adoption of an 
oppressively formal discovery policy. In fact, under the City's 
current open-file policy, defendants have full access to all of 
the information possessed by the prosecution (Tr. at 64). 
In this case, both defendant Joan Patton and Michael 
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Humiston, attorney for defendant William Patton, took the 
oppor t.un i i ', ' 11 ' i s i I q ri a i nt i f fr s office to review ,the file. 
The file contains the charging information as well as a cover 
sheet entitled Provo City Attorneyfs Office Criminal Information 
Sheet. This sheet has a heading entitled Witnesses (cmcers) . 
Under that heading, the following is written: Anthony Malloy 
(zoning) and Roger Gonzalez (zoning). (Tr. at 64). 
At trial, Defendant's attorney asserted the following: 
"[E]very document 11. :;ns i-L^ e was prcviaec • n IHP in c^^:c\ery 
except the one that '-'r. McGinn is referring * 5 the 
fllSL ' ' ' ' : .. : - : •.. I tt G 
this claim, the cover sheet iri question would have been in the 
f - 1 1 ] f c .• :: t: " -r 
documents. Only intentional removal oy trie City Attorneys office 
woi lid explain the absence of the cover sheet. T i"\^ areater 
possibility is simple oversight on the part of jetencants and 
their counsel. 
Even defendanL J^an rd., :. __ -j- J- -- . u -
subterfuge on the part of the City: personally did not feel 
nor do I believe thai the oversight was intention on the pari of 
the Provo City prosecutor" (Sentencing Transcript at 5). 
Assuming arguendo that the cover sheet was mysteriously absent on 
those occasions in wllich defendants reviewed the file, there ~s 
HI 
also mention of officer Gonzalez in another of the file's 
documents. 
In a memorandum dated March 20, 1996 (from officer Molloy to 
Gary McGinn), officer Molloy states the following: "March 19, 
1996, I went with Roger Gonzalez to the site and took the 
attached photos." Like the cover sheet, this memorandum was also 
a part of Defendant's file. This memorandum clearly indicates 
that officer Molloy was accompanied by officer Gonzalez to the 
specific property in question on the day for which the zoning 
violation was charged. Based on the informal nature of the 
discovery process, such a document alone should adequately place 
a defendant on notice. Interestingly, Defendants have failed to 
allege the absence of this document from the file to which they 
were given full access. 
Defendants have simply failed to show that Provo City was 
derelict in its duty to provide reasonable discovery. In short, 
by giving Defendants unlimited access to the entire file, 
Plainitiffs fulfilled their duty to provide all materials 
requested. Pursuant to Plaintiff's standard open-file policy, 
Defendants were placed on notice that officer Gonzalez was a 
listed witness. Defendants have simply failed to establish that 
they were intentionally misled at any point during the discovery 
process. 
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Testimony of allege rprise il i ."/ had no prejudicial. 
impact on Defendant 
Even assuming arguendo that Provo City failed to" 
provide adequate discco v e i: ^  , I) e f e i 1 d a i i t: s 1 i a \ e f a I ] e :I I: : 
demonstrate that the introduction of testimony by officer 
G o n z a 1 e z i a s ]:: :i : • = • j i i ::l :i • : :i a 3 I: : 1 1 I = :i 3 : • : a s • • = R i I 1 e 3 0 (a ! : • f 1:1 : € I J t a h 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Any error, defect, 
irreaul ari •--- or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded.'7 
Thus, the Court must engage i^ ~ two-prong analysis _i st, 
it must determine whether the ^i^a-
officer Gonzalez's testimony. Only upon an affirmative response 
t' : • 1:1 le abo v e • 31 ]'t;st i H I I , ',o?? * e 
Court finds the trial court was m error, ~r\:s: • .e:. determine 
whet1"- l MI WH, suffi "*: c-rr "•* rrr^udiciai Lu warrant 
reversal. State v. Carter, ,-/ ;;.2a 656, 662 (Utah 1985). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following: 
We have ruled in several cases that the Rule 
30 phrase "affect the substantial rights of a 
party" means that an error warrants reversal "only 
if a review of the record persuades the court that 
without the error there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." 
State v. KnigixL, .J,^ > .^d 913, 919 (Utah 198 ?) (citing State v. 
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)). 
A ^reasonable likelihood' is only achieved when Mthe 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict." Horrel v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996), (quoting 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
Even without officer Gonzalez's testimony, it is clear that 
defendants would have nevertheless been convicted in this case. 
Defendants baldly assert that "all other evidence other than 
Mr. Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge" 
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This statement is demonstrably false. 
In convicting Defendants, the trial judge specifically relied 
upon the testimony of all three witnesses, not just officer 
Gonzalez (Tr. at 115-116). 
Next, Defendants assert the following: "The court found only 
that there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and 
this was a matter that only Mr. Gonzales had testified to" 
(Defendants' Brief at 12). Again, this assertion is demonstrably 
false. To begin, the Court never found that firewood was present 
on the property. Rather, the court determined that scraps of 
wood were found on the property. (Tr. at 116). 
Further, Defendants' claim that Mr. Gonzalez was the only 
person to testify concerning scrap wood in the yard is also 
demonstrably false. At various points during the trial, officer 
Molloy also testified that scrap wood was present on the front 
yard: "In the front yard there were lumber — specific items 
that are listed in that section of the ordinance" (Tr. at 9); 
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"There were lumber and other debris. He had things that. I would 
s ^ "- -* ;v^  i ng t] : ash that I would remove from the
 vlot, but I 
ao noc recall the specifics7' (Tr. at 24) 
Despite the above statements specifically referring to 
scrap wood, Defendants object to officei: Mo] ] : y ' s i i 1 abi 1 i I::y I : 
recall greater specifics. :a:::, officer Molloy' s recollection 
o f s c r ap 1 urribe i: :i i i 11 ie f . - ' -
conviction for a violation of § 14.34.u80:; . After all, scrap 
ma^^r • •= • - • "'] y 1 i sted a s a prohibited item. 
Plaintiff's m :,,.ch cases can hardly be expected to produce 
itemized lists of trash and ^unk down to the last: Tvir.kie 
wrapper. NonetheieLo, in t:ie m s t a n L casef officer ^ ^ ^ s 
testimony was no4" 1-nited to scrap wood. • -ic; , efficer Molloy 
tes tif:i e :i a s t : 
(Tr. at 2 4 ) , "trash" :r . at 24 , "-junk" at , , "scrap 
m a t e r i a ] (T i: T <-- - - - -  ' :i : -. z 
51) Most of the aoove items are specifically mentioned in the 
ordinance. As such, officer Molloy fs testimony, as believed by 
the court, was more than sufficient in and of itself to warrant 
conviction. 
corroborated by Defendants' only witness, Brent Keller. While 
b e i n g qu e s t i o n e d 1 : ] , D e f e n d a n 1: s, 1 1 i I : • = .1 ] < E; I: : f f e r e d 11 > : I: : ] ] : > « :i i g : 
The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's not a 
neighborhood I would like "~ 'iv- A n . There are 
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are 
yards with piles of rock and debris. One house in 
particular stands out as I went through the 
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's 
a carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the 
ceiling. I couldn't even — I imagine there were 
many dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is 
about four houses down from the Patton residence. 
A house not to far away, a log house, the 
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the 
area are very similar. It's an older 
neighborhood, the houses aren't well kept, the 
yard aren't well kept, they are not the immaculate 
yards that I see in many of the other parts of 
Provo. That's how I's describe the neighborhood. 
Q. Is there a substantial difference 
between the defendant's property and the rest 
of the neighborhood? 
A. Not that I noticed . . . 
(Tr. at 93-94). 
Apparently this testimony was offered in an attempt to show 
discriminatory enforcement of the zoning ordinances. According 
to Defense Counsel: "Our position is that it's an arbitrary 
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being singled out 
for no apparent reason . . ." (Tr. at 96). This claim was 
summarily rejected by the Court (Tr. at 97-98). In fact, officer 
Molloy testified that Defendants' were not the only ones on the 
street charged with zoning violations (Tr. at 55). Further, 
officer Molloy testified the instant charges were precipitated by 
"several calls from concerned residents in regards to your 
property" (Tr. at 56-57). 
Obviously, Mr. Keller's testimony was relied upon heavily by 
the trial court in deciding to convict (Tr. at 115). At 
13 
sentencing, the judge reiterated: 
You folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for 
you as your witness, and Mr. Keller described the 
condition of the your property at the time in 
question, who was your witness, as being an 
eyesore. It was a terrible neighborhood, he said, 
and yours — and the condition of your property 
was consistent with the way things look in 
general, it was bad. I mean he painted a picture 
for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not 
acceptable. 
(Sentencing Transcript at 16-17). 
As pointed out in Defendants' brief, a number of factors 
must be considered in determining whether a witness' testimony is 
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal Defendants' Brief at 
13). Among those included are: 
1. The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case; 
2. Whether the testimony is cumulative; 
3. The presence or absence of corroborating or 
contradicting testimony; 
4. The extent of cross examination; and 
5. The overall strength of the case. 
(Defendants' Brief at 13)(citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 
902 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987) . 
In light of the facts present in this case, analysis of the 
above factors weighs in favor of affirming Defendants' 
conviction. First, it has been clearly established that 
sufficient evidence existed to warrant a conviction even without 
the testimony of Mr. Gonzalez. The testimony of Mr. Gonzalez was 
largely cumulative. The thrust of Mr. Gonzalez's testimony 
merely confirmed the existence of the "debris of wood and lumber 
14 
scraps that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the 
yard. . ." (Tr. at 68). 
The next factor to be considered is the presence or absence 
of corroborating or contradicting testimony. Defendants failed 
to introduce a scintilla of testimony that contradicted either 
the testimony of officer Molloy or officer Gonzalez. On the 
contrary, testimony from Defendants' only witness actually 
corroborated testimony offered by the prosecution witnesses. 
Another factor to be considered is the extent of cross 
examination. Although Mr. Gonzalez was subjected to cross 
examination by Defendant's counsel, it is claimed that "[c]ross 
examination was limited by the element of surprise . . ." 
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This claim is severely undermined by 
the simple fact that Mr. Gonzalez only testified as to the 
condition of Defendants' property on March 19, 1996. Such 
testimony hardly constitutes sandbagging. Surely, Defendants and 
counsel were adequately prepared to discuss the condition of the 
property on the very day of the charged offense. 
Finally, the overall strength of the case must be 
considered. The prosecution's case was supported by every single 
witness presented to the trial court. Defendants failed to offer 
a single word of testimony in contradiction. While the 
prosecution offered specific testimony that the yard was out of 
compliance on the day in question, Defendants were relegated to 
15 
claiming discriminatory enforcement (Tr. at 96) and contesting 
the Constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. (Tr. ,at 110). In 
accordance with this stratagem, most of the cross examination of 
officer Molloy was focused on whether or not the Provo City Code 
adequately defines common words such as "junk" and "scrap 
material" (Tr. at 47-50). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the 
testimony of officer Gonzalez. Defendants were given full access 
to the entire file in accordance with Plaintiff's open-file 
policy. Defendants should have thus been on notice that officer 
Gonzalez was a witness. Further, even if this court were to 
find error in the trial court's decision to allow officer 
Gonzalez to testify, his testimony was not sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal. Based on the foregoing 
arguments, Plaintiff moves that Defendants' conviction for 
illegal storage of junk in violation of Provo City Code § 
14.34.080(3) be affirmed. 
Dated this 1 ( day of March, 1998. 
Christine M. Petersen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed to each of the following 
this 11 day of March, 1998: 
Michael Humiston 
Attorney for William Patton 
23 West Center St. 
P.O. Box 486 
Heber City, UT 84032 
and 
Joan Patton 
Appellant Pro Se 
1067 North 750 West 
Provo UT 84604 
Christine M. Petersen 
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ADDENDUM 
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basis in the zoning contacts? 
A. I'd work with the zoning ordinance, the 
zoning map, other supporting documentation that Utah 
County has; building permits, Utah County ownership 
records. 
Q. And how long did you work there? 
A. Approximately six months. 
Q. And then from there you've went to -- got 
employment with Provo City; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What type of materials in relation to zoning 
do you use on a daily basis for Provo City? 
A. I use the zoning ordinance and the zoning 
map. We have a case file history of previous cases 
that we've worked with, also with building permit 
records and also the Utah County Recorder's Office 
information. 
""""^  utti^ " T'TOg tke approximate date of when you 
came to work for Provo City? 
A. It was in November of 1995. 
Q. At that time when you came to work what 
duties were assigned to you? 
A. In our office different areas are assigned 
to a specific zoning officer so that we can take care 
of specific areas and follow through with those cases. 
I was assigned a specific area of Provo City. 
Q. After you were assigned this specific area 
what did you do? 
A. I was given several cases, and also we 
receive zoning complaints that are called in or people 
come into the counter, and we receive from those --
that information we proceed to investigate whether 
there is any violation, and then I act on that kind of 
information. 
Q. Were you given a file concerning the Patton 
property? 
A. I was. 
Q-. What were your instructions with that file? 
A. I was informed that I should proceed to go 
out into the field and verify that there was still a 
continuing violation. I did that, and there was a 
violation in my opinion at the site. 
Q. What violation are you talking about? 
A. Violation of Section 14-34-080, the 
accumulation of junk, trash and other materials in the 
yard. 
Q. And you say you went to the site? 
A. I did, I went out to the property. 
Q. And what did you do when you arrived there? 
A. I looked around the site to see if there 
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were materials that are specified in Section 14-34-030 
in the yard area. I did not go onto the site, I 
viewed the site from the public right-of-way. or the 
sidewalk. 
Q. At that point what types of materials did 
you see? 
A. I saw numerous materials that I don't recaLl 
specifics on. In the front yard area there were 
lumber -- specific items that are listed in that 
section of the ordinance. There was in addition a 
trailer in the front yard area that appeared to be 
inoperable, which is a violation of the city 
ordinance. 
I also saw the fence that was on the front 
property line, and it was in excess of three feet in 
height, which is restricted by the city zoning 
ordinance. 
Q. rar. Malloy, on what day approximately was 
this that you went out to the property for the first 
time? 
A. I have here a note that I did go to the sice 
and sent the first letter out February 23, 1996. 
Q. So it was sometime around--
A. Around that date, either that day or the day 
before the letter was sent to William and Joan Patton 
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I went to the site. 
Q. Now you indicated you sent a letter. What 
is this letter, and when did the letter go out in 
relationship to your visit? 
A. The letter went out on February 23rd. In 
that letter I informed the owners of the property the 
information I obtained from the Utah County Recorder's 
Office that the office had been contacted regarding a 
zoning violation, I had been to the site and verified 
the violation was in existence, and requested that 
they contact me in order that we can gain compliance 
for the zoning ordinance (inaudible). 
Q. To whom was this letter sent? 
A. It was to William and Joan Patton. 
Q. And why did you send a letter to William and 
Joan Pattoii? 
A. in some situations our office will contact 
the. people physically at the site. In this situation 
I decided not to, since there is a notice posted on 
the fence to all local and federal agents to not enter 
the property. 
Q. And so is that the reason you didn't attempt 
to make personal contact? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What did the letter^contain? What did you 
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March llth I actually did receive a letter from Joan 
Patton. Different issues were addressed in the 
letter, but at no time did I receive the opinion they 
were willing to comply with the city zoning ordinance. 
THE COURT: What was the date of the letter? 
THE WITNESS: That was March 11, 1996. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MCGINN: Your Honor, how would you like 
to do these? Do you want these marked individually, 
or group them together as A--
THE COURT: No, just mark them 1, 2, 3 et 
cetera. How many do you have? 
MR. MCGINN: I don't know. I have--
THE COURT: 
| got a few? 
1 MR. MCGINN: 
THE COURT: 
WR> MCGINN: 
MR. MCGINN: 
Do you have dozens or have you 
I've got approximately 10. 
Okay, mark them that way. 
Okay. 
Your Honor, I have shown these 
photographs to counsel. May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: 
Ms. Patton? 
MR. MCGINN: 
THE COURT: 
You may. Have you shown them to 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Q. BY MR. MCGINN: Mr. Malloy, would you take a 
1 here today when you're testifying, would you please 
2 just refer all your comments to the violation that 
3 exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot 
4 will be saved for another day? 
5 A. I will. 
6 Q. Thank you, would you please take the stand 
7 again, 
8 (Witness resumes stand) 
9 Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as what 
10 you've described on the board, showing a residence and 
11 a parking pad, correct? 
12 A. It is. 
13 Q. In that front yard area what types of 
14 materials did you see on that day that you felt were a 
15 violation of 14-34-080? 
16 A. I do not recall specifics, but there were 
17 numerous violations on that lot. In addition to the 
18 trmbimr that is the most obvious or most apparent 
19 violation when you first look at the lot. 
20 Q. Do you remember in general what cypes of 
21 materials were on that? 
22 A. There were lumber and other debri,s. He had 
23 J things that I would see as just being_trash that I 
24 would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the 
25 specifics. 
Mr. Humiston? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUMISTON: 
Q. Mr. Malloy, starting from your most recent 
testimony, I understand that you say that you have 
received citizen complaints? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You have personally received citizen 
complaints from neighbors? 
A. I have spoken with neighbors or people who 
say they are neighbors during the process of this 
case, that is correct. 
Q. Did you initiate the contact with those 
neighbors? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Have those complaints come in before or 
after we've last met at this court (inaudible) 
F^femary (inaudible)? 
A. I have received contact prior to that date 
and since that date with questions regarding what was 
going to happen, and that the yard is in -- needs some 
attention. 
Q. Is it not true that you stated at that time 
in February that there had in fact been no citizen 
complaints? 
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether 
or not the property was in violation on March 19, 
1996. 
MR. HUMISTON: May I approach? 
THE COURT: You bet, you sure may. 
Q. BY MS. PATTON: I would like to ask what the 
condition of the properties in the neighborhood that 
the defendant resides in, as you would have possibly 
seen this morning? 
A. The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's not 
a neighborhood I would like to live in. There are 
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards 
with piles of rocks and debris. One house in 
particular stands out as I went through the 
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a 
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the 
ceiling. I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many 
dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four 
houses down ftrem the Patton residence. 
A house not too far away, a log house, the 
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the area 
are very similar. It's an older neighborhood, the 
houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept, 
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of 
the other parts of Provo. That's how I'd describe the 
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neighborhood. 
Q. Is there a substantial difference between 
the defendant's property and the rest of the 
neighborhood? 
A. Not that I noticed, not unless you go out 
probably two blocks away to where a brand new 
apartment --a large apartment complex has been built, 
and there the yards are very nice, the lawn is cut, 
watered regularly, looks quite nice, but once you get 
past that the houses, in my opinion, are not that 
different. 
MS. PATTON: Just one moment, your Honor. 
Your Honor, I've never done this before, so may I 
approach Mr. Keller? 
THE COURT: Let's have any photographs 
you've got marked as exhibits. You want to tell me 
when they were taken? 
MS. PATTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, tell me when they were 
taken. 
MS. PATTON: Today, although the camera says 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Can you tell me the relevancy of 
photos taken today? If you've cleaned it all up--
MS. PATTON: This isn't mine, this is--
1 the City is working on those. I just don't understand 
2 the relevance. 
3 MR. HUMISTON: May I speak to that, your 
4 Honor? 
5 THE COURT: Sure. 
6 MR. HUMISTON: In Ms. Patton7s cross 
7 examination of Mr. Malloy, there was substantial 
8 testimony that a lot of these determinations are 
9 subjective. We're dealing here basically with an 
10 administrative agent, Mr. Malloy, who makes subjective 
11 determinations. 
12 Our position is that it's an arbitrary 
13 (inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being 
14 singled out for no apparent reason, and this gees to 
15 the fact that this testimony would -- this evidence 
16 would (inaudible) numerous violations. 
17 As far as whether any of these specific ones 
18 J are being prosecuted, we would find that if Mr. Malloy 
19 ! cares to testify to that, but we're not aware of any. 
20 We are --we think it's significant that there are 
21 numerous trailers on the street, numerous trailers 
22 that have been parked there for a long time, and as 
23 far as you can tell, the trailer seems to be the sole 
24 issue at this point. 
25 MR. MCGINN: Objection to that. We're not 
1 talking about any trailer on the street. We're 
2 talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the 
3 front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage, 
4 trash, junk, those types of materials in the front 
5 yard. That's what we're here about, we're not here 
6 about trailers in the streets, whether people have 
7 things parked--
8 MR. HUMISTON: Maybe we're arguing semantics 
9 here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on 
10 the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers 
11 in yards, junk in front of houses. We have evidence 
12 of all of that, and we are curious as to why the 
13 Pattons are being singled out when I think evidence 
14 would show, relative to some of these other houses, 
15 j it's actually quite a bit cleaner. 
16 MR. MCGINN: My contention is that there has 
17 been no showing of any evidence anywhere that the 
18 Pattons have been singled out. In cross examination I 
19 I thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other 
20 violations in the area that they're working on. 
21 THE COURT: I don't have any evidence of 
22 discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City 
23 Ordinances. The fact that we may have a junky 
24 neighbornood and that the defendant's property 
25 complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky, 
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too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory 
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants. 
So we've got the testimony from this 
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the 
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks 
about the same as everybody else. I don't think we 
need anything else with respect to neighborhood 
description. 
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of 
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's 
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or 
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no 
violation. 
MR. HUMISTON: So are you sustaining the--
THE COURT: I'm sustaining the objection to 
the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the 
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked 
like. That's what you wanted to do with them, that's 
what she said. 
MR. HUMISTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Patton, are you through 
with this gentleman? 
MS. PATTON: I have no further questions for 
the witness as this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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that in that neighborhood there are many houses with 
trash, garbage and other materials, and said that the 
Pattons' home fit the same pattern. 
There were three witnesses, all three 
witnesses testified that there is trash and garbage in 
the yard, and two witnesses testified specifically 
that on March 19, 1996 there was trash and garbage. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Patton? 
MS. PATTON: For purposes of appeal, your 
Honor, I would like to have noted for the record my 
objection that both ordinances under Count I and II 
are arbitrary and (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, Count II is dismissed. 
MS. PATTON: Okay, then Count I. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted for the 
record, thank you. 
MS. PATTON: Both ordinances under Count I 
violate the equal protection clause of the Utah 
Constitution under the 14th Amendment of the U. S. 
Constitution. 
The prosecution has failed to prove that I 
have had the criminal intent necessary to violate the 
ordinances. If I lack the substantial understanding 
1 anything else that you folks have. I'll let him speak 
2 and then I'll come back to you. 
3 MR. HUMISTON: I'd just assume he speak 
4 first, if that's all right. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Now let's go to my 
6 question. What do we have by way of compliance, and 
7 I what request does the City have by way of sentencing? 
8 1 MR. MCGINN: Yes, your Honor. As far as 
9 compliance, in the first case we had two charges, and 
10 • we dismissed the (inaudible) case, as the Court will 
11 remember, because the problem where we have actually 
12 two lots rather than just the one, and we were 
13 focusing on 1067. 
14 ( THE COURT: Count I was the one that had tne 
15 conviction on it. 
16 MR. MCGINN: Yes, and therefore we will just 
17 | address the one lot. Your Honor, this, as my 
13 understanding is now, and the zoning officer can 
19 verify this, is the last time he wenc by that the 
20 I problem with the storage of trash and junk materials 
21 in the front yard has been taken care of? 
22 J MR. MALLOY: Correct. 
23 I MR. MCGINN: At this point it has been taken 
24 care of. Your Honor, however in the past, there -~ 
25 this is the third case that we've had in court now 
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with this same issue on just the garbage'and junk. 
Now there are other zoning violations out there, but I 
believe the Court indicated we should only be talking 
about the junk today. 
In 1990 there was a conviction to trash 
storage in an open area, and the improper storage. 
Judge Dimmick at that time gave a fine of $20 0 and 3 0 
days in jail suspended it all upon compliance, being 
cleaned up. At one point it was cleaned up, then 
again it became dirty and junky. 
We've had another trial, this time from 
Judge Hansen in November of 1993. At that time Judge 
Hansen again heard evidence and found the defendant 
guilty. 
At that time he imposed a sentence of $1,030 
fine, 18 0 days in jail, again suspended everything, 
pursuant to a one year probationary period in which 
the defendant was to clean it up. 
At that time as probation was draxving to a 
close, the City attempted to 'file an order to show 
cause to indicate that the problem was still there. 
The Court held a hearing, and in the end of 1995 the 
term then (inaudible) the Court's jurisdiction had 
expired, that the notice for the order to show cause 
had not been filed in a timely matter and notice was 
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not given to the defendant, and therefore the Court 
could not extend the probation. 
So at that time is when the zoning officer 
was given a file to go out and follow up on this, and 
that brings us to where we are here today. 
Your Honor, yes, it is clean at this time, 
but as you can see with the previous cases, it's a 
problem that it gets cleaned up, and then it happens 
again, and we have a cycle of cleaning up and it's 
not -- apparently not cleaned voluntarily, but it 
requires the City to file some sort of action and go 
in, and in the first case, even require to the point 
where the City had to go in and clean it up itself. 
THE COURT: You'll have an opportunity, Ms. 
Patton. 
MR. MCGINN: Based on that, your Honor, we 
would -- what the City is looking for is compliance in 
these cases. We don't want to see any people 
necessarily fined a lot of money or spend time in jail 
over something like this. We want to have a 
neighborhood and community that people are proud of, 
and we want it — we believe that the zoning laws are 
there for a good reason. 
In this case, unfortunately, we don't have a 
whole lot of voluntarily compliance. It's taken up a 
1 piece of it ended up at the dump. It was all very 
2 high quality tools and equipment that was taken 
3 directly out of the carport and there were witnesses 
4 to the fact that it all ended up in the garages and 
5 I carports of the city workers who took it. 
6 That's a fairly drastic punishment that's 
7 already been imposed on prior occasions, and in light: 
8 of that and, as I say, the Court's feeling that we've 
9 been here before. I feel that those things have been 
10 paid for as far as penalties sought by the City. This 
11 one should be addressed under its own merits. The 
12 City has said straight up that they wanted compliance 
13 and they have obtained compliance. Anything further 
14 beyond that basically amounts to overkill. 
15 I THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Patton, and 
16 gentlemen, when I wrote on this pad I have no 
17 intention to babysit you folks, that's really what I 
18 feel. I don't --by that, I'm not interested in the 
19 City running out to your home every 90 days and 
20 sending a report back to this Court to see if you've 
21 kept things like you should have. 
22 You're adults, you ought to know by now 
23 what's acceptable and what's not acceptable. You 
24 folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for you as your 
25 witness, and Mr. Keller described the condition of 
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your property at the time in question, who was your 
witness, as being an eyesore. It was a terrible 
neighborhood, he said, and yours -- and the condition 
of your property was consistent with the way things 
look in general, it was bad. I mean he painted a 
picture for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not 
acceptable. 
So my attitude is this. You've been found 
guilty of Count I, you've cleaned up the property 
which is now acceptable to the City and the zoning 
requirement, and that's what I'm interested in. 
I'm going to impose the following sentence. 
With respect to Count I, a class B misdemeanor as to 
Joan Patton, I'm going to impose a sentence of $500 
and 3 0 days in Utah County Jail. 
I will suspend all of the fine and all of 
the time on the condition that the property remains in 
an acceptable condition, no further violation of the 
City for one year. 
With respect to the case of Provo City vs. 
William Patton, I'm going to impose the same fine and 
the same penalty with respect to time, and will not --
will stay the execution of both the sentence and the 
fine on the condition that the property remains in the 
condition it is now for a period of one year. 
